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EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY
INSURANCE AND EX POST MORAL HAZARD
Erin E. Meyerst & Joni Hersch
Many businesses purchase Employment PracticesLiability Insurance (EPLI), a form of insurance that protects them
from claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and
wrongful termination. But critics of EPLI argue that allowing
insurancecoverage for employment liability detractsfrom employment law's goal of deterrence andfrom notions ofjustice.
We assess the validity of these criticisms by examining the
nature of employment law claims and by reviewing characteristics of the current EPLI market. We find that past critiques
miss the mark in diagnosing EPLI's major problem.
The EPLI market, for the most part, functions in a way
that poses little to no threat to the goals of employment law.
However, one specflc characteristic of EPLI stands out as
particularly concerning. Our review of market sources indicates that EPLI contracts, as currently written, often do not
exclude intentionalactions of any sort. As such, EPLI policies
generally cover employment law claims regardless of whether
upper management (i.e., those responsiblefor decision making
on behalf of the business) played a role in the prohibited employment action, eitherfrom the outset or as partof a cover-up.
This current EPLI market norm explains why insurers
agreed to pay out The Weinstein Company's (TWC) and codefendants' liability for Harvey Weinstein's pervasive sexual
harassment, even though Weinstein's behavior was widely
known within TWC. We argue that this outcome is troubling
from the standpoint of ex post moral hazard. Insuring liability
for this type of behavior incentivizes a business's decision
makers to attempt to cover up instances of discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination, rather
than addressing them head-on.
Despite this significant concern, we argue that the EPLI
market can enhance employment law's goals of deterring bad
behavior and compensating victims but only if properly struct J.D./Ph.D., Program in Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School.
erin.e.meyers@vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to David Eckles, Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, and Kevin Stack for their extremely helpful comments. Many thanks to
the editors of the Comell Law Review for their help in preparing this piece for
publication.
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tured. Specically, we suggest that the extent of a business's
fault, as evidenced through upper-management involvement,
should correlatewith their directpayment of damages. Under
such a system, a business like TWC in which upper management knew of the unlawful activities would be held to a higher
standardof accountability than, for instance, a business that
immediately addresses allegations of a hostile work environment created by a mid-level employee.
We propose regulating EPLI contracts by mandating
that-in cases of upper-management bad faith-either EPLI
insurershave the right to pursue subrogationagainstthe business or the business must pay a minimum proportionalrisk
sharing (i.e., coinsurance) rate. Concurrently, legislatures
could grant the EEOC (and corresponding state and local
agencies) the power to pursue uninsurablefines in the most
egregious cases. Such a structure would hold businesses accountable in situations when upper management plays a role
in the commission or cover-up of a prohibitedemployment action while still allowing the EPLI market to reduce risk to businesses, disseminate best practices, and help compensate
victims.
INTRODUCTION ..............................................
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INTRODUCTION

In a class action regarding Harvey Weinstein's serial sexual
harassment, insurers recently offered a settlement of $18.9
million to his victims.' Despite the clearly intentional nature of
Weinstein's actions, insurance companies would have paid the
full tab under this agreement. 2 Under this agreement, insurers
were further set to pay more than $15 million to cover Weinstein and other defendants' defense costs. 3 While the court
rejected the settlement, insurers will most likely pay for all
damages in the case.
At first glance, insurance coverage for sexual harassment
seems to violate both insurers' profit-maximizing incentives
and society's notions of fairness. Indeed, the majority of insurance contracts either cover only losses arising from "accidents"
or contain express exclusions for intentional acts. These exclusions stem from the fundamental premise that insurance protects against losses stemming from unforeseen and exogenous
occurrences (i.e., risks). Intentional acts are the product of a
decision rather than a risk, and thus tend to fall outside the
scope of insurance. Yet, as the Weinstein example demonstrates, sometimes insurance covers liability from intentional
acts. This leads to questions of when, and why, illegal intentional employment practices like sexual harassment are insured. The answer is complicated and rooted in theories of
principal-agent relationships.
The workplace is covered by a panoply of laws intended to
protect workers, and businesses that violate these laws can be
sued by private parties or government agencies. Businesses
can purchase insurance policies-known generally as Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI)-to cover various
claims brought under these laws. The most common EPLI coverage protects businesses from claims of discrimination, harassment, wrongful termination, and retaliation.
EPLI may seem undesirable and an affront to fairness.
Weinstein and his enablers' likely payment via insurance
rather than from personal funds clearly runs afoul of societal
1 Settlement Agreement and Release at 120, Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings,
No. 1:17-cv-09554-AKH (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020).
2 Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, No. 1:17-cv-09554 (AKH), 2020 WL

4266925, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020) (noting that the $18.9 million class action
settlement came from a fund set up by The Weinstein Company's (TWC) insurers).
3 Id. at *2, *6 (noting that under the bankruptcy agreement that was paired
with the proposed class action settlement, insurers allocated $15.2 million in
defense costs for TWC officers and directors, including the Weinstein brothers).
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notions of justice. 4 Moreover, insuring intentional acts heightens the well-known problem of moral hazard, in which insurance weakens incentives to act prudently. 5 Indeed, EPLI has
been criticized on both of these grounds. 6
In this Article, we combine insurance theory, a review of
EPLI market reports, and previous academic commentary to
assess EPLI's desirability in today's legal environment. Despite
concerns that EPLI is counterproductive to the deterrence
function of employment law, EPLI creates many benefits. It
enhances the ability of the legal system to compensate victims
of wrongful employment acts, provides well-intentioned businesses with risk transfer, and disseminates risk management
practices through insurer-business relationships.
Our conclusion is that the existence of EPLI is beneficial to
society, with one major caveat. For the most part, EPLI as it
operates today is no more or less desirable than any other type
of liability insurance. In the many cases when a business is
held liable because of the actions of its employee on either a
negligence or vicarious liability basis, EPLI acts just as other
types of commercial liability insurance. While an individual
employee's actions may have been intentional and reprehensible, upper management might reasonably have been unaware
of its employee's behavior. From the standpoint of the business itself in these cases, the employee's behavior becomes
more akin to an unanticipated risk and similar to the type of
risks that insurance is intended to, and does, protect.
However, a certain subset of EPLI coverage should give
regulators pause. Namely, EPLI coverage in cases when upper
management either participated in or failed to adequately react
to allegations of wrongful employment acts diverges from standard insurance practices. For simplicity, we refer to these
cases as employer-facilitated wrongs. Also included in our definition of employer-facilitated wrongs is a business's failure to
set up a reasonable reporting system for wrongful employment
4 While Weinstein was ultimately held accountable in criminal court, there
are many examples of sexual harassment that do not rise to the level of criminal
conduct. See Alan Feuer, 5 Takeaways from the Weinstein Verdict, N.Y. TfMEs
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-rape-guilty.html [https://perma.cc/N5RD-VUJZ. For instance, serial verbal abusers may not be held accountable under criminal law, regardless of their
conduct's severity. See Sexual Harassment, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/2YBY-DS8V] (last visited Aug. 30,
2020).
5 Efficient awards for deterrence are set as the ratio of loss divided by
probability of detection.
6 See infra Part IV.
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acts. The definition of upper management should vary based
on company size and structure and should reflect the locus of
decision making in the company.
Consider a situation wherein a company's upper management fails to address an employee's continuous racist comments because the employee's performance at work is
especially valuable. Or consider the instance of Weinstein himself, wherein his harassing behavior was "widely known" within
7
The Weinstein Company, yet it went unaddressed for years.
Providing full insurance coverage for these employer-facilitated
wrongs introduces, what we argue is, an unjustifiable level of
ex post moral hazard. The fact that EPLI further covers punitive damages only aggravates the situation.
We propose two related solutions that could maintain the
benefits that EPLI creates while penalizing the actions of businesses that tolerate illegal employment practices. First, legislators could regulate EPLI contracts. This could take on many
different forms and we suggest two-either mandatory proportional risk sharing (i.e., coinsurance) or a right to subrogation
in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs. Each of these options
would place a greater expected financial burden on insured
businesses when their decision makers either commit or cover
up illegal employment actions.
Currently, even lawsuits filed by the EEOC and state employment commissions are insurable under EPLI contracts.
This leaves regulatory action at minimal effectiveness against
insured businesses. Under our proposal, damages resulting
from EEOC or state employment commission actions would be
subject to the same contractual regulations as damages from
private actions, that is, mandatory coinsurance or right to subrogation. In addition to regulating EPLI contracts, legislatures
could expand the enforcement toolbox available to the EEOC
and state employment commissions by giving them the power
to pursue uninsurable regulatory fines.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the goals
of employment law. Part II introduces the concept of commercial liability insurance and explains how EPLI has developed as
a part of businesses' insurance portfolios. Part III examines
7 Ronan Farrow, FromAggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein's Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://
www.newyorker. com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/5YRVREXU] (noting that sixteen executives and assistants stated that Weinstein's "behavior was widely known within both Miramax and the Weinstein Company").
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facets of the current EPLI market. Part IV summarizes prior
commentary on EPLI and pushes back on broad criticisms of
EPLI as a whole. Part V presents our assessment of EPLI's
ability to further employment law's goals of compensation and
deterrence. In this Part, we argue that the only major problem
with EPLI is insurance coverage for upper management's intentional acts, which is exacerbated by providing coverage for punitive damages. Part VI discusses our proposed solutions of
either regulating EPLI contracts or instituting uninsurable regulatory fines and explains how these options could help alleviate the acute issue of ex post moral hazard in EPLI.

I
THE GOALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW

A subset of employment law creates rights for individual
workers. 8 Major areas of protective employment law include
employment discrimination, minimum wage regulations, unemployment compensation, and regulation of pension plans. 9
While employment law prohibits a range of business practices, only some fall under the scope of EPLI's coverage. The
language in EPLI policies generally provides coverage for
"wrongful employment acts," which are defined in the policy
and subject to a number of exclusions. 10 While the definition
and exclusions vary by policy, coverage typically extends at a
minimum to instances of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wrongful termination. 1 1 This Article focuses its
analysis on these four actions, which will collectively be referred to as wrongful employment acts.
Congress and state legislatures have passed an extensive
body of laws seeking to combat wrongful employment acts. For
example, on the federal level, discriminatory acts in the workplace are outlawed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
8 Employment, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/employment [https://perma.cc/Q6BT-TE42] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020) (describing employment laws as "protective labor legislation" and describing various subsets of
employment law that protect workers).

9

Id.

10

JOSEPH M. GAGLIARDO & SARA P. YAGER, PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMP'T, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE (EPLI) POLICIES AND COVERAGE 7-8 (2017),

http://www.lanermuchin.com/media/news/ 10EmploymentPracticesLiability
_InsuranceEPLIPoliciesandCoverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV9H-Z9QR.
11 Id. In contrast, employment laws involving compensation and benefits
policies at the firm level, such as practices covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) laws,

are generally excluded from EPLI coverage. Id. at 8.
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(on the basis of race, sex, religion, nationality, and color), 12 the
Americans with Disabilities Act (on the basis of physical and
mental disabilities),1 3 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (on the basis of age),1 4 among other laws. Federal
laws create a floor for protections, and some states offer additional protections via state laws. Regardless of the source,
prohibitions on wrongful employment acts seek to protect
workers with two goals in mind: deterring future wrongful employment acts and compensating employees who are
wronged.15
A.

Compensation

When crafting regulations, Congress can choose a public
or private enforcement mechanism or a combination of the two.
Public enforcement involves the government stepping in to enforce the law, like in criminal justice actions or regulatory
fines. 16 Private enforcement, in contrast, involves providing
incentives for private individuals to bring suits against those
who break the law. 17
Employment law enforcement relies heavily on private
rights of action.1 8 To incentivize plaintiffs who experience
wrongful employment acts to bring suits against their employers, Congress and state legislatures have granted the right to
damages that compensate those victims for their losses.
Available damages in employment actions include
backpay,19 front pay, 2 0 compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 2 1 While all five of these serve the
12
13

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).

14

Id. §§ 12101-12102.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018).

15

See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-65 n.21

(1976) (endorsing the "rightful place" theory); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 420-21 (1975) (endorsing the "make whole" theory). See also H.R. REP.
No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991) (stating that a purpose of the Title VII amendments

"is to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal civil
rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for
victims of discrimination").
16 See J. Maria Glover, The StructuralRole of PrivateEnforcement Mechanisms
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1147 (2012).
17 See id.
18 See id. at 1151.
19

H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 34.
Front Pay, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION, https://
www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/front-pay [https://perma.cc/C4RJ-94AV] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) ("Front pay is an equitable remedy, an element of the 'make
whole' relief available to victims of employment discrimination.").
21 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102-103, 105 Stat. 1071,
20

1072-74 (1991). Note that punitive damages are not available in disparate impact
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deterrence mechanism that private enforcement seeks to
achieve, four of the damages categories also seek to provide fair
compensation to wrongful-employment-act victims. Only punitive damages are not directly related to the goal of compensating victims for their costs and therefore serve solely the
purpose of deterring bad behavior.
B.

Deterrence

Preventing discrimination in the workplace is one of the
named purposes of many employment statutes. 2 2 Theoretically, making businesses liable to their employees for any
wrongful employment acts should incentivize businesses to
find ways to reduce or eliminate the occurrence of such acts.
Employment laws ideally should incentivize businesses to
reduce wrongful employment acts both ex ante and ex post. Ex
ante efforts are a business's investments that seek to prevent
the occurrence of wrongful employment acts in the first instance. Ex post efforts are those taken by a business to minimize the harm caused by a wrongful employment act that has
already occurred.
From an ex ante standpoint, businesses can make investments designed to prevent wrongful employment acts within
their workplaces. 2 3 Each firm's risk of wrongful employment
acts varies based on a number of factors, including the size of
the firm, its industry, its culture, and its system of training and
accountability. Some of these factors are not realistically
within the company's range of potential changes when it comes
to managing the risk of wrongful employment acts. For example, a firm will not change its industry to reduce the risk that
its employees experience discrimination, nor will it reduce its
workforce size with only that goal in mind.
However, a firm can meaningfully alter its culture and its
system of training and accountability in order to achieve a
fairer workplace. Under this framework, the firm can invest
resources in developing a culture and accountability system
cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2018). Punitive damages are also not available
in ADEA actions; instead, liquidated damages act as a substitute for punitive
damages in cases of willful violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2018).
22 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102 (stating its purpose is to eliminate
"discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
23 See e.g., What Is Employment PracticesLiabilityInsurance(EPLI)?, INS. INFO.
INST., https://www.iii.org/article/what-employment-practices-liability-insurance-epli [https://perma.cc/UL6X-9DPWI (lastvisited Feb. 8, 2021) (listing different ways businesses can train their managers and employees to prevent
employment lawsuits).
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that reduce the likelihood that prohibited employment practices occur in the first place. Employment law, then, seeks to
incentivize businesses to invest in healthy workplace cultures
and effective systems of training and accountability.
From an ex post standpoint, the threat of employment liability should incentivize businesses to address wrongful employment acts head-on in order to reduce their impact. For
example, if a human resources department is made aware of
alleged racial discrimination in one of its stores, it should work
to resolve the issue instead of ignoring or attempting to hide it.
The threat of employment liability should additionally discourage deliberate ignorance of wrongful employment acts. In other
words, a business should not be able to avoid ex post responsibilities by failing to set up a reasonable system for reporting
wrongful employment acts.
In order to induce businesses to responsibly address
wrongful employment acts, the penalties for a business that
fails to address or attempts to cover up a wrongful employment
act of which it is aware-or fails to set up a reasonable reporting system in the first instance-should be more severe than
the penalties for a business that maintains an adequate reporting system and addresses employment wrongs swiftly. If there
is no additional penalty for attempting to cover up an employment wrong, businesses will face economic incentives that en-

courage them to ignore or cover up their wrongs.
Indeed, this is a function of punitive damages in employment law. For example, in cases where a business might otherwise be held liable for punitive damages in a Title VII suit, it is
protected by a safe harbor if it can establish that it acted in
good faith to comply with Title VII.24 In cases where upper
management attempts to cover up a wrongful employment act,
a business certainly could not establish the good faith safe
harbor and would expose itself to punitive damages.
While businesses can invest resources to reduce instances
of and mitigate harms from wrongful employment acts, they
still may wish to purchase insurance to cover the risk of employment suits. For instance, it may be impossible for some
businesses to eliminate all wrongful employment acts, especially large companies that cannot directly monitor and control
all of their employees. Others may purchase insurance be24 See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999) ("[Iln the
punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are
contrary to the employer's good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.").
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cause of concerns about false accusations of wrongful employment acts and a desire to have insurance to cover defense
costs. We next move to explain the overall function of commercial insurance and the specific nature and history of EPLI.
II
COMMERCIAL INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY

Most people's experience with liability insurance is largely
limited to personal lines, such as homeowners or automobile
insurance. In exchange for a premium payment, an insurer
promises to pay for certain instances of legal liability.2 5 For
example, if my neighbor experiences a slip-and-fall on my icy
sidewalk, my homeowners policy would pay for their medical
costs. If I get into a car accident that is my fault, my automobile liability policy would pay for the other drivers' car damage
and medical costs. Each of these policies provides peace of
mind that a moment of bad luck or negligence will not strip me
of my assets.
Most of us do not devote much brain space to the world of
liability insurance that exists beyond our own personal policies. However, commercial insurance makes up a large portion
of the insurance market, as businesses face an array of risks in
everyday operations that expose them to potential liability. 26
One of the major liability risks faced by businesses is employment liability. 2 7 This subset of liability includes any claim
brought by an employee or job applicant (outside of bodily injury and physical harm, which is covered by workers' compensation). This Part discusses how employment liability fits into
the broader nature of business risk and how businesses manage and insure against such risks.
A.

Commercial Insurance

Businesses face a complicated set of risks, only some of
which are insurable. For instance, a business cannot
purchase insurance for the risk that its product is unpopular
and doesn't sell. The set of insurable commercial risks can
25 See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1551-52 (2017).

26 In 2018, insurers wrote $287.1 billion in commercial property and liability
insurance. Archived Graphs, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/graph-archive/
96080 [https://perma.cc/HAP7-6HKW] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
27 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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generally be subdivided into property risks and liability risks. 28
Property risks cover damage to a business's own property (e.g.,
damage to an assembly line caused by a fire), while liability
risks include damages owed to a third party via legal liability.
At the most common level, a basic Commercial General
Liability (CGL) policy covers liability to third parties for bodily
injury, property damage, and emotional distress, subject to a
wide range of exclusions. 2 9 Because CGL policies are subject
to many exclusions, businesses must determine what additional coverages their specific situation requires. For instance,
lawyers and doctors often purchase professional liability (malpractice) coverage, which is not available under a CGL policy. 3 0
Manufacturers purchase products liability insurance, similarly
excluded from CGL. 3 1
Other, more commonplace business risks are also excluded under CGL policies. For instance, any coverage for liability arising from operation of commercial vehicles must be
purchased under a separate policy. 3 2 Most importantly for this
Article, on-the-job harm that employees experience is excluded
from CGL policies. Specifically, injuries to employees are excluded from CGL policies either under the workers' compensation exclusion (no coverage for physical injuries) or the
employer's liability exclusion (no coverage for violations of employment law). 33 While workers' compensation coverage is
mandated by law in almost all states and dealt with under a
28

While the insurance industry sometimes refers to liability insurance as

casualty insurance, we refer to it here as liability insurance to avoid using insurance-industry-specific terms.
29

See 9A STEVEN PLiT, DANIEL MALDONADO, JOSHUA D. ROGERS & JORDAN R.

PLT, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:3 (3d ed. 2020); see also Commercial General
Liability Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/commercial-general-liability-insurance [https://perma.cc/UE75-7XH6] (last visited Jan. 31,

2021) (describing commercial general liability insurance). These policies also
cover personal injury arising specifically from false arrest, malicious prosecution,
wrongful eviction, slander or libel, and privacy violations. PLIT, MALDONADO, ROGERS & PLITI, supra at § 129:8. For examples of what is excluded from CGL policies,
see infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
30 See General Liability vs ProfessionalLiability Insurance, PROGRESSIVE COM.,

https: / /www.progressivecommercial. com/business-insurance/general-liabilityvs-professional-liability/

[https://perma.cc/2HTK-RD99]

(last visited Aug. 26,

2020).
31 See Product Liability Insurance vs GeneralLiability, EK INS., https://ekinsurance.com/cgl/product-liability-insurance-vs-general-liability.html [https://
perma.cc/72KF-BV3K] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
32 See What Does General Liability Insurance Cover?, HARTFORD, https://

www.thehartford. com/general-liability-insurance/what-does-general-liabilitycover [https://perma.cc/D76L-YKXX] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
33
See PLT, MALDONADO, ROGERS & PLIT, supra note 29 at § 129:12.
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separate insurance scheme, 3 4 individual business are left to
determine whether to purchase coverage for employment practices (i.e., EPLI). 3 5 The remainder of this Part describes the
history of EPLI, the risks it covers, and its unique features as
compared with other types of commercial liability insurance.
B.

EPLI History

While federal employment discrimination laws have been
on the books since the 1960s, 3 6 EPLI did not come on the scene
until the early 1990s. The thirty-year gap between the development of federal employment liability and the development of
insurance to protect against that liability is likely due to the
absence of financial incentives under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Prior to the 1991 Civil Right Act, which amended Title VII,
damages in Title VII lawsuits were limited to equitable relief of
backpay and front pay, 3 7 meaning plaintiffs could recover
neither compensatory nor punitive damages for violations of
employment law.
Not only were damages limited to backpay and front pay
before 1991, but a string of cases in the late 1980s made it
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to win employment discrimination cases. 3 8 The low value of these claims combined with
the low likelihood of success caused Congress to become concerned about the efficacy of private enforcement. In response,
Congress enacted the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act
in order to increase incentives for private plaintiffs to bring
suits for violations of civil rights laws. 3 9 The amendment
34 See Workers' Compensation Laws - State by State Comparison, NFIB
(June 7, 2017), https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workerscompensation-laws-state-by-state-comparison-57181/ [https://perma.cc/8CZ5AC2Z].
35 See Does My Business Need EPLI Insurance?, JUSTWORKs (Nov. 9, 2017),

https: //justworks.com/blog/what-is-epli-and-does-your-company-need-it
[https://perma.cc/Q4UB-WQZH] ("Although it's not a legal requirement for a
company to have EPLI insurance, it may be a good idea given the rising volume
and costs of employment practices litigation.").
36

See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNTY COMM'N, https:/

/www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc [https://perma.cc/U6DW-P3CV]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2021). An earlier federal law prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.

§

1982 (1970)).

37 The Supreme Court construes front pay as a form of backpay. See Pollard
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 849 (2001) (giving examples of
two 1971 cases in which front pay was awarded and describing front pay as a
form of backpay).
38 See Sean Farhang & Douglas M. Spencer, Legislating Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation, 2 J.L. & Cms. 241, 248 (2014).

39

See id.
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sought to achieve this goal in two ways. First, it allowed for
compensatory and punitive damages, raising the potential dollar value of employment claims. 4 0 Second, by allowing compensatory damages, plaintiffs were additionally granted the
right to a jury trial, which many perceive as more plaintiff
friendly. 4 1
As a result of the 1991 amendment, the expected value of
employment suits increased greatly. As economists wouldand Congress did-predict, employment-related litigation increased markedly in the following years. 4 2
Prior to the 1990s, the losses a business might have paid
out for employment-related claims were likely too low to warrant concern over insurability. 4 3 However, the 1991 amendment not only markedly increased monetary damages for
successful employment discrimination claims, but relatedly increased the volume of claims.44 Thus, the exposure that businesses faced from employment practices liability increased
both in scope and severity.
During this same timeframe, businesses were filing employment liability claims against their insurance companies
under their CGL policies. 4 5 These businesses achieved mixed
success in obtaining recovery. 4 6 Due to the legal uncertainty
surrounding CGL coverage of employment claims, combined
with the rising prevalence and cost of employment lawsuits,
insurers began explicitly excluding employment-related liability from coverage under CGL policies. 4 7 These exclusions left a
hole in coverage for businesses wanting to shield themselves
from costs associated with defending employment lawsuits and
paying damages, creating a demand for a new product.
This demand eventually evolved into a new insurance
product-EPLI. At the outset, EPLI was somewhat uncommon
and only five insurers wrote EPLI coverage. 48 Now, there are
40
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,
1072 (1991); Farhang & Spencer, supra note 38, at 249.
41 § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073; Farhang & Spencer, supra note 38, at 249.

42
43
44

See Farhang & Spencer, supra note 38, at 253 flg.2.
See id. at 249.
See id.
See Amanda D. Smith, "Supervisor"Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-

45
ment Claims, Liability Insurance and the Trend Towards Negligence, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 263, 279-81 (1997).
46 See id.

47

See Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination

Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 13 (1997).
RICHARD S. BETTERLEY, THE BETTERLEY REPORT: EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
48
ITY INSURANCE MARKET SURVEY 3 (2019).
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more than fifty active insurers in the stand-alone EPLI market. 4 9 Even as employment liability exposure has expanded
and contracted over time, EPLI continues to grow.
III
THE EPLI MARKET TODAY

The Betterley EPLI report is a well-respected publication
that has summarized the state of the EPLI market each year
since 1991.50 Each year's report provides a wealth of information, including policy provisions and definitions, limits usually
purchased, deductibles and coinsurance available, and a general market snapshot. 5 1
EPLI coverage extends to both the business itself and any
employee working for the business. 5 2 However, the majority of
employment discrimination law is designed with vicarious liability of the business in mind, and many times liability from
employment law doesn't reach the actual employee who committed a violation. For instance, an employee who sexually
harasses a coworker is not individually liable for their actions
under Title VII.53 Given this structure of employment law, EPLI
most often acts to protect businesses themselves for vicarious
liability arising from the actions of their employees.
Insurers generally offer EPLI in one of two ways: as an
endorsement to Directors & Officers liability insurance (D&O
insurance) or separately as a standalone policy. 5 4 An endorsement to a D&O policy covers the instances in which an individual is liable as a fiduciary. In contrast, standalone policies are
more wide sweeping, are more common, and cover the business
itself.
49

Id.

See id. Richard Betterley is a risk consultant who publishes six reports
annually on the state of specialty insurance products. Betterley markets his
consulting "services to corporations, educational institutions, and other organizations throughout the United States[,]" and his reports are available for purchase
online. See Biographies:Richard S. Betterley, IRMI, https://www.irmi.com/biographies/richard-betterley [https://perma.cc/7ULQ-JND6] (last visited Sept. 1,
2020).
51
See BETT'ERLEY, supra note 48.
50

52

Id. at 42-52.
See Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits
of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REv. 799, 801-02
53

(2000).
54 Tamara Bruno, An Overview of Insurance Coveragefor Claims of Sexual
Harassment and Assault, 16 J. TEx. INS. L. 17, 21 (2018).
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Scope of the Market

Large employers purchase EPLI at much higher rates than
small employers. A recent estimate puts take-up rates in the
40 percent range for companies with more than 1,000 employees, in contrast to a 7 percent take-up rate in companies with
1-25 employees.5 5 A range of businesses across industries
purchase EPLI. In 2018, the largest purchaser was the "Information, Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, and Professional Business Services" industry. 5 6 Other
large drivers of premiums include "Educational Services,
Health Care, and Social Assistance," "Trade, Transportation,
and Warehousing," and "State and Local Government."5 7
Some industries clearly present higher risk for workplace
misbehavior than others. For instance, the #MeToo movement
carries implications for insurers writing EPLI coverage. The
Betterley Report predicts that many EPLI carriers are at risk of
paying out large claims in the coming years, especially in the
entertainment industry. 5 8 As a result, many insurers have
pulled out of the market for EPLI in the entertainment industry
and are refusing to provide coverage to entertainment businesses altogether due to the risks they present. 59 Other insurers are scrutinizing EPLI applicants in the entertainment
industry more thoroughly than those from other industries. 6 0
The entertainment industry is not the only problematic
segment of businesses. Other examples of industries that
some insurers refuse to write EPLI coverage for include law
offices, car dealerships, adult entertainment businesses, and
casinos, among others. 6 1 One inference that might be made
about these industries is that the risks they present are unacceptable to insurers either because of unpredictability or a high
loss rate.

55 See ADVISEN INS. INTEL., COMPLETE THE PICTURE: A SPOTLIGHT ON THE UNITED
STATES EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET 12 (2014).
56 BETTERLEY, supra note 48, at 10. This is measured in terms of direct written premium. Id.
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id at 4.

Id. at 28-30.
Id. at 6-7.
See id. at 28-30.
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Addressing Moral Hazard

Moral hazard-described by insurance law expert Tom
Baker as the "insurance-deterrence tradeoff' 2 -stands for the
concern that a business with liability insurance will underinvest in precautions that would reduce the likelihood or severity of a loss. 6 3 Or, in simpler terms, moral hazard posits that
those who have insurance coverage are prone to act less
carefully.
Moral hazard is problematic from both a public policy
standpoint and the insurer's profit-driven standpoint. Any
moral hazard arising from liability insurance is problematic for
society in general. All else equal, society would prefer a world
with fewer wrongs. Thus, if moral hazard reduces care and, in
turn, increases the prevalence of injuries and other wrongs,
society is worse off.
From a private standpoint, moral hazard creates a direct
loss to the insurer. Moral hazard arises when an insurer cannot precisely know the level of care its insured invests in and,
therefore, cannot set the premium to perfectly reflect the insured's expected loss. 6 4 Any reduction in care on the part of
the insured increases the likelihood of a loss, which is paid for
by the insurer. 65 Thus, insurers seek to minimize moral hazard among their insureds. 6 6
Insurers have come up with a variety of strategies for reducing moral hazard among insureds. Some common methods
used are deductibles, limits, and proportional risk sharing
(also called coinsurance in some contexts). Two of these strategies-deductibles and limits-are commonly used in liability
insurance and act as a means of keeping the insured's "skin in

the game." 67
A deductible is the amount the insured must pay toward a
loss before the insurance coverage kicks in. A limit is the maximum amount the insurer will pay for the loss. Policies can be
62

See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurancefor Punitive Damages, 1998 WIs.

L. REV. 101, 102 (1998).

63

See Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demandfor Liability Insur-

ance: An Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1687 (1994).
64
Id
65 See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 1553. One counterargument is that

insurers can simply adjust their premiums upward to reflect moral hazard. However, insurers benefit from reducing moral hazard because it allows them to
reduce their premiums and increase their market share. Id.
66 See Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 86-87
(2000).

67

Rappaport, supranote 25, at 1555.
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written with both a deductible and a limit. Example 1 illustrates how each works.
Example 1
The Pawnee Parks Department (the Department) purchases an
EPLI policy from JJ's Insurance. Jean-Ralphio Saperstein applies
for a job with the Department and is passed over for another
candidate. Jean-Ralphio sues for discriminatory hiring practices
under Title VII. Although Jean-Ralphio loses his case, the suit
costs $60,000 to defend.
Policy
Paid for by the
Paid for by JJ's
Provision
Department
Insurance
$55,000
$5,000
$5,000 Deductible
$20,000 Deductible
$20,000
$40,000
$50,000 Limit
$10,000
$50,000
$0
$60,000
$100,000 Limit
$5,000 Deductible
$10,000
$50,000
& $50,000 Limit
$20,000 Deductible
$20,000
$40,000
& $100,000 Limit

While insurers benefit from deductibles and limits because
they reduce moral hazard, insureds often choose policies with
such provisions because they reduce their premiums. In general, the higher a deductible and the lower a policy limit, the
less expensive the policy will be. 6 8
The 2019 Betterley Report summarizes the major EPLI insurers' menu of options for insureds when it comes to deductibles, limits, and proportional risk sharing. Twenty of the
thirty-two insurers included in the report do not offer policies
with a $0 deductible and list a minimum deductible ranging
from $1,000 to $1,000,000.69 Of the twelve insurers that do
not list a nonzero minimum, only four specifically state that
they offer policies with a $0 deductible, and the remaining eight
are ambiguous.70
68 For example, for AXIS's EPLI line in Tennessee, an insured pays 60 percent
more for a policy with a deductible of $0 than a policy with a retention of $25,000.
In comparison to a policy with a deductible of $1,000,000, an insured pays 220
percent more for a policy with a deductible of $0. This rating reflects the tradeoff
between reducing moral hazard and lower premium costs. This information is
available at https://filingaccess.serff.com/sfa/search/filingSummary.xhtml?flingld=131595539

[https://perma.cc/2ZZK-BFHZ

Mar. 5, 2020) (file labeled "Rating Plan Addendum").
69 BELTTERLEY, supra note 48, at 31-32.
70

Id.

(last visited
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In terms of policy limits, the highest listed limit is $50
million, with the majority of companies offering limits up to $25
million.71 None of the thirty-two insurers require a minimum
proportional-risk-sharing rate, and the majority state that the
insured can choose any level. Proportional risk sharing is both
uncommon and used largely by choice of the insured.
Beyond using the tools of deductibles and limits, insurance
companies can raise premium prices or refuse to renew an
insured's policy based on its annual loss experience. The
threat of a rate increase or nonrenewal provides another incentive for insureds to invest in measures that would prevent
wrongful employment acts. Insurers can also base premiums
on insureds' reported employment practices, as set forth in
their EPLI applications.
Applications for EPLI insurance are generally extensive,
asking about the applicant's business practices, employment
numbers and turnover rates, and any past employment
claims. 72 Any material misstatement or omission on an insurance application is grounds for noncoverage if a claim arises. 7 3
Thus, businesses have strong incentives to provide all relevant
information requested on an EPLI application. This, in turn,
means that insurance companies have a wealth of information
on applicants' and renewing insureds' employment practices
and loss experience when pricing EPLI policies. Renewal applications, however, are generally less extensive than initial
applications. 74
71

Id. at 33-34.
See, e.g., Application for Employment Practices Insurance, IRONSHORE,
https://www.ironshore.com/pdfs/products/EPLIApplication.pdf) [https://
perma.cc/QFJ3-A6LE] (last visited Sept. 1, 2020) (listing questions related to
business practices and other relevant information for underwriting); Employment
Practices Liability Coverage Application, TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/
iw-documents/apps-forms/epl/epl-1100e-ind.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S9HS9YY] (last visited Sept. 1, 2020) (showing the typical questions asked on insurance forms relating to business processes).
73 See, e.g., Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Victorville Speedwash, Inc., No. Cv. 1407909-AB (SHx), 2015 WL 12656274, at *1, *4 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2015) (revoking
an insurance contract in light of a material misrepresentation and explaining that
the level of fault surrounding the misstatement is irrelevant).
74 One of Weinstein's EPLI insurers initially argued for noncoverage on the
basis of an application misrepresentation from 2005. See Defendant Harvey
Weinstein's Third-Party Complaint for Breach of Contract and Breach of the Duty
72

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Bad Faith) at 2-11, Fed. Ins. Co. v. Weinstein,
No. 18 Civ. 2526 (PAC), 2019 WL 1407455 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019). Presumably,

the fact that the insurer had to reach back to a misrepresentation made on an
application twelve years prior is because the renewal applications were less extensive and, thus, did not contain enough information to include any
misrepresentations.
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Finally, loss prevention programs are another means for
reducing moral hazard. Insurers in the EPLI realm offer extensive loss prevention programs for their insureds, which insurers market as being provided at no additional cost. 7 5 Seven of
the thirty-two insurers included in the Betterley Report offer a
1-800 number for employee complaints, while twenty-four of
thirty-two offer a hotline for insured businesses to call with
legal questions regarding employment practices. 7 6 Twenty insurers offer assistance with crafting employment policies or
handbooks, either through a model employment handbook or
sample guidelines for employment practices. 7 7 Twenty-one insurers offer education and training on employment best
practices. 7 8
Twenty-nine insurers offer risk management consulting
services, provided mostly on an unlimited basis. Three insurers offer consulting from an HR professional, twenty-five offer
the consulting services of an attorney, and one insurer offers
consulting from either an HR professional or attorney.79
C.

Claims Handling and Liability Limits

Liability policies can be written in one of two ways: defense
inside or outside limits. EPLI is generally written with defense
costs inside the limits of the policy-also known as a "shrinking limits" provision. 8 0 An example illustrates. Suppose Eleanor's Margarita Bar is sued by Tahani. Eleanor has an
insurance policy with a $1 million limit. If the defense costs
$200,000, there will be only $800,000 left of insurance coverage to pay out any damages to Tahani. Therefore, if a judgment
for Tahani is any greater than $800,000, Eleanor-if she has
the available funds-will have to pay the additional money out
of her own pocket. 8 1 In contrast, a policy that is written
75 BETTERLEY, supra note 48, at 95-102. Of course, the net cost of these loss
prevention services is priced into the premiums. There is no opt out option that
would lower premiums, which would indicate insurers seek to incentivize firms to
use these services. This provides an additional rationale for our subrogation and
coinsurance proposals. If firms do not use these services that are available to
them at zero marginal cost, the argument for not covering intentional acts is
heightened.
76 Id. at 95-100.
77
Id.
78

Id.

Id. at 101-02.
See Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI), IRMI, https://
www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/employment-practices-liability-in79
80

surance [https://perma.cc/B6ZV-FAL5] (last visited Sept. 3, 2020).
In practice, however, there is good evidence that in cases against commer81

cial defendants, actual payouts rarely exceed the policy limit. Tom Baker, Liabil-
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outside the limits would cover the $200,000 defense costs and
still have $1 million left available to pay damages.
The defense-in-limits setup is advantageous to insurers
because it places a definite cap on the amount of loss for any
single claim. However, as the example illustrates, it can be
counterproductive for victim compensation. For claims that
exceed the policy limit, any money spent on defense costs whittles away at the likely damage award for the victim, as research
demonstrates that insurance policy limits often act as de facto
limits on damages. 8 2
One of the reasons cited by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in rejecting the proposed Weinstein class action settlement was related to the problems created by shrinking limits. The proposed settlement would have
been paid entirely by insurance policies and would have allocated approximately $19 million to compensate victims in the
class, while allocating approximately $15 million to Weinstein's
legal defense. 83 The judge noted that favoring the costs of
Weinstein's defense at the expense of impacted victims was
"obnoxious. "84
D.

Intentional Acts and Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are a point of contention in liability insurance. A number of states have outlawed insurance for punitive damages on the basis of public policy concerns. 8 5
However, EPLI insurers have come up with workarounds to
respond to market demand for insurance against punitive
damages even in states that prohibit punitive damages coverage. All insurers from the Betterley Report offer policies without a punitive damages exclusion. 8 6
Many EPLI policies include "most favored venue" language
or are written using a "wrap-around" policy, each of which
ity Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2005). We return to this point as it relates

to the employment context.
82 Id.
83 See Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, No. 1:17-Cv-9554 (AKH), 2020 WL
4266925, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).
84 1I. at *6.
85 See Tom Hams, EPLI & Punitive Damages:Coverage Exists, But Be Careful,
NU PROPERTY CASUALTY 3600 (Dec. 5, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://
www.propertycasualty360.com/2010/ 12/05/epli-punitive-damages-coverageexists-but-be-careful/ [https://perma.cc/Q4S5-S6GX].
86

See BETTERLEY, supranote 48, at 91-94. For Title VII and the ADA, punitive

damage caps are low and do not present much financial threat. However, many
corresponding state claims have no statutory punitive damage caps.
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allows insurance for punitive damages regardless of an individual state's laws. 8 7 Most favored venue clauses state that the
jurisdiction that is most permissive towards coverage of punitive damages will govern their insurability, so long as the jurisdiction meets certain criteria. 8 8 Wrap-around policies are
written abroad, often in Bermuda, and write coverage for punitive damages on the basis that state laws do not apply to
them. 8 9 Insurers often use these strategies to provide punitive
damages coverage and market their EPLI policies as inclusive
of punitive damage awards. 9 0 Notably, both of these strategies
for insuring punitive damages are seldom used for other insurance lines, highlighting that the insurance of punitive damages
is especially prevalent in the EPLI context. 9 1 While the validity
of wrap-around policies has not been tested in court, they are
nonetheless written by insurers and purchased by large
companies.92
Beyond covering punitive damages, many insurers offer
policies that contain no exclusion for intentional acts. Of the
thirty-two insurers listed in the Betterley Report, twenty-six
state that they offer EPLI policies with no intentional acts exclusion. 93 Of the remaining six insurers, three state that exclusions apply for deliberately fraudulent or criminal actions, but
only if a court finds in a final adjudication that the action giving
rise to the loss was fraudulent or deliberate. 9 4 Examples A and
B below show provisions from sample policies of major insurers
to illustrate how intentional, criminal, and fraudulent acts are
treated, as well as punitive damages.
87 See Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in Employment Practices
Liability Insurance:The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments, 21 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 323, 331 (1999).
88
Most Favored Venue Wording, IRMI, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/most-favored-venue-wording [https://perma.cc/668G-GXWP]
(last visited Sept. 3, 2020).
89 Wrap-Around Policy, IRMI, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/wrap-around-policy [https://perma.cc/5WRY-B4R2] (last visited Sept. 3,
2020).
90 See, e.g., Employment Practices Liability, PHIIA. INS. COMPANIES, https://
www.phly.com/mplDivision/managementLiability/EPLI.aspx [https://perma.cc/
LRR8-FEDR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (listing "(m]ost favorable venue wording
for punitive, multiple or exemplary damages" as a benefit of EPLI coverage).
91 Most favorable venue clauses are generally used in EPLI, directors and
officers insurance, and professional insurance policies. See Most FavoredVenue
Wording, supra note 88; Wrap-Around Policy, supra note 89.
92 See Wrap-Around Policy, supra note 89.
BETTERLEY, supra note 48, at 91-94.
93
94

Id.
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EXAMPLE A

Example Policy Language - A
Coverage includes "failure or refusal to create or
enforce adequate workplace or employment policies
and procedures ... "95
Exclusions
None related to criminal, fraudulent, or intentional
acts
Most Favored Covered loss includes "punitive or exemplary
Venue Clause damages or the multiple portion of any multiplied
damage award if insurable under the applicable law
most favored to the insurability of punitive,
96
exemplary, or multiplied damages"
EmployerLevel Fault

EXAMPLE B

Example Policy Language - B
EmployerCoverage includes "failure to provide and enforce
Level Fault
adequate workplace or employment policies and
procedures" 9 7
Exclusions
No coverage for employer if a final adjudication
determines that the employer committed a
deliberately fraudulent or criminal act 9 8
Most Favored "The enforceability of the foregoing coverage shall
Venue Clause be governed by such applicable law which most
favors coverage for punitive or exemplary damages
or the multiple portion of any multiplied damages
award"9 9

IV
PREVIOUS CRITICISMS OF EPLI

Discussion on EPLI's desirability has popped up in legal
scholarship since it began growing in the mid-1990s. 1 0 0 A variety of criticisms have been launched against EPLI, framing it as
95

EMPLOYMENT

PRACTICES

LIABILrTY

COVERAGE

§

II.Y.10, TRAVELERS (2009),

https: //www.travelers.com/iw-documents/apps-forms/epl/epl-3001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M3H2-XMXBI.
96 Id. II.L.
97 Employment PracticesLiability Insurance Policy § III.G.10, GREAT AM. INS.
Cos.,
https:// abais.com/Data/Sites/ 1/media/specimen/ sbg/gaic-eplipolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5MN-4AEX (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
98 Id. § IV.A.
99 Id. § III.J.
100 See, e.g., Mootz, supranote 47, at 4 ("This article analyzes the increasing
reliance by employers on liability insurance to manage the risk of employment
discrimination liabilities, and predicts some of the consequences of this emerging
trend."); Francis J. Mootz III, Insuring Employer Liabilityfor Hostile Work Environment Claims: How Changes in DiscriminationLaw May Affect the Growing Market
for Employment-Related PracticesLiability Insurance, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369,
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cutting against the goals of employment law. The criticisms
brought against EPLI focus on moral hazard at a general level,
along with notions of justice.101 This Part addresses each of
these points in turn and explains why the criticisms are overstated in many EPLI claims. All in all, we find that from all but
one angle, EPLI is no more concerning than any other type of
liability insurance.
As discussed in subpart III.B, insurance elicits concerns of
moral hazard-in other words, that businesses purchasing insurance will choose to invest less in culture and accountability
(ex ante moral hazard) and fail to act to minimize the harm
from a wrongful employment act that has already occurred (ex
post moral hazard). To the authors' knowledge, no EPLI analysis has considered separately how moral hazard affects businesses' ex ante and ex post efforts at addressing wrongful
employment acts.
Moral hazard is far from a unique concern in the EPLI
context. It has been debated extensively in courtrooms and
academic literature and is a problem that is inherent to the
very nature of insurance. 102 Thus, in considering the desirability of EPLI, it is not sensible to consider whether EPLI introduces any moral hazard into the world but rather whether
the moral hazard it introduces raises concerns above and beyond that of the insurance industry more generally.
Some commentators have argued that moral hazard is indeed of special concern in the EPLI context. 10 3 They claim that
businesses face only liability damages as a disincentive from
committing wrongful employment acts and that insurance for
liability removes this sole incentive.1 0 4 In making this argument, they contrast wrongful employment acts to car accidents, pointing out that a driver deciding how carefully to drive
faces potential injury to themself, above and beyond any harm
they cause other drivers and pedestrians. Thus, even if they
have an insurance policy to pay out any damages to a third
party, they are still incentivized to take care in order to avoid
370 (1999) (discussing the complexity of employment law and insurers' ability to
succeed in the market).
101 Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield & Gregory Todd Jones, The Peculiar
Moral Hazard of Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Realignment of the
Incentive to Transfer Risk with the Incentive to Prevent Discrimination, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 639, 648-49 (2006).
102 See Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurancefor

Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256, 1285-86 (1994).
103
104

Gabel, Mansfield & Jones, supra note 101, at 640-41.
Id.
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hurting themself and their own car in an accident. In contrast,
these critics suggest that the employee-victim is the only one
who is harmed in cases of employment discrimination and harassment, whereas the business is not injured itself.1 0 5
However, this argument overlooks research on discrimination, harassment, and productivity in the workplace. Businesses do suffer harm in cases of discrimination in terms of
both reputational harm and lost productivity from inefficient
turnover and absenteeism.1 0 6 This criticism further ignores
that many forms of commercial liability insurance track similar
incentives as those in the EPLI context. Insureds in the context
of medical malpractice, legal malpractice, workers' compensation, commercial general liability, and products liability all face
similar incentives as businesses in the EPLI context. The hospital, law firm, employer, business owner, and manufacturer in
these contexts do not face potential for direct injury outside of
reputational harm and legal liability. In these cases, the main
incentive for avoiding third-party injury comes in the form of
liability damages.
Some also criticize EPLI as cutting against societal notions
of justice. 107 To the extent that EPLI allows discriminators to
evade financial responsibility for their actions, victims and society will likely have some justice-related objections. However,
this particular criticism is weakened by the fact that the insured businesses and individual employees who commit these
acts are not one and the same. Thus, insuring the business is
105

See id.

106

See JONI HERSCH, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 1 (IZA World of
Labor, 2015), available at https://wol.iza.org/articles/sexual-harassment-inworkplace/long [https://perma.cc/7Y9W-G6NJ]; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING

CHALLENGES 24 (1995), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?
[https://
docnumber=253661&version=253948&application=ACROBAT
perma.cc/2M7P-AAFY];

Louise F. Fitzgerald, Fritz Drasgow, Charles L. Hulin,

Michele J. Gelfand & Vicki J. Magley, Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual
Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 578, 583-86 (1997); Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law
and Firm Profitability, 26 J. HuM. RESOURCES 139, 148 (1991) (showing that firms
involved in employment discrimination litigation suffer substantial loss in stock
market value); Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond the Individual Victim:
Linking Sexual Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 387, 392-95 (2005); Chelsea R. Wiliness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A
Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 135-37 (2007); Roger Showley, Sexual Harassment: A Hit to Business Bottomline?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Dec. 1, 2017, 2:36

PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/growth-development/
sd-fl-econometer3dec17-story.html [https://perma.cc/AX3Q-KVAR].
107 See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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more like the insurance of a risk to be mitigated than the insurance of an intentional act. A business cannot perfectly screen
out employees who will commit unlawful or objectionable acts.
This is especially true of large companies, where extensively
monitoring every employee would be nearly impossible.
One commentator takes issue with the fact that "insurance
companies and institutions use a risk-based logic and institutionalize a way of thinking centered on risk management and
reduction."1 0 8 This objection expresses concern that EPLI undermines legal rights because insurers frame the acts underlying employment litigation as risks that "need[ ] to be managed
(rather than a sign of morally wrongful conduct that must be
eradicated)."' 0 9
However, this argument seems to disapprove of the exact
actions that employment law is designed to encourage. Many
instances of discrimination are not the morally wrongful conduct of the business itself but rather acts of its employee(s).
Indeed, employment liability is designed not to hold an individual bad actor liable, but rather to hold that bad actor's employer liable through respondeat superior.
To the extent that insured businesses prioritize managing
risk and minimizing employees' discriminatory conduct over
focusing on the moral wrongness of discrimination and harassment, they are prioritizing the deterrence goal of employment
discrimination law. In the same way that businesses are responsible for the physical safety of their employees, they are
responsible for ensuring their employees do not experience discrimination or harassment. Both are risks to be managed, and
the more effective a business is at managing risks and reducing
harm to employees, the better.
While we disagree with the need to think of most employment law violations under a moral framework, given this level
of separation between the insured business and its employees
committing wrongful employment acts, there are moral undertones in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs. The next Part
sums up our assessment of the current EPLI market, with a
focus on our concern with the apparent practice of insuring
employer-facilitated wrongs.
108

Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The

Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REv. 463, 492 (2017).

109 Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries:How Insurance CompaniesConstruct
the Meaning of Compliance with AntidiscriminationLaws, 37 L. & PoL'Y 209, 233
(2015).
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V
ASSESSING EPLI'S IMPACT

Insurance's impact on compensation and deterrence are
widely discussed themes within both the law and the insurance
literatures. This Part combines insurance theory, our market
review, and previous commentary on EPLI to assess the impact
of EPLI on employment law's goals.
In reviewing the current EPLI market, a number of factors
point toward EPLI being beneficial to society. First, liability
insurance reduces the problem of judgment-proof defendants,'10 allowing victims greater access to compensation for
harm.
Second, EPLI provides a major benefit to businesses. It
allows them to reduce uncertainty and operate their businesses without fear of catastrophic employment liability based
on negligence or vicarious liability. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, insurance companies provide loss prevention programs, such as trainings, legal and HR advice, and best practices materials to their insureds."' These programs may
ultimately reduce the amount of discrimination in the world by
harnessing expertise of large insurance companies and HR professionals to inform smaller businesses' employment practices.
On the other side of EPLI's desirability are moral hazard
and justice-based notions. Moral hazard provides the easiest
and most common basis to criticize any form of liability insurance. This criticism presents a more general problem than that
created by EPLI specifically and, as such, is not alone a justification for deeming EPLI undesirable.
To the extent insurance creates moral hazard, it is important to consider whether the level of moral hazard extends
beyond a level society is willing to accept. In examining EPLI's
effect on deterrence, we split moral hazard concerns into ex
1 10
Judgment-proof defendants are those who have insufficient assets to cover
the damages from a lawsuit, and insurance funds can supplement their ability to
pay. Judgment-Proof, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judg-

ment-proof [https://perma.cc/8RYT-3EZC] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
1 11 For example, The Hartford provides trainings on "sensitive topics" such as

sexual harassment and wrongful termination, articles on current employment
practices trends, and model employee handbooks. See Employment Practices Liability Insurance, HARTFORD, https://www.thehartford.com/employment-practices-insurance [https://perma.cc/VF36-EA6X] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
Many insurers also provide self-audit checklists that help businesses maintain
employment best practices. See, e.g., EPLI Insurance, GRANGE INS., https://
www.grangeinsurance.com/insurance/business/epli-insurance
[https://
perma.cc/38AA-A52Q] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020) (noting that insureds are
granted access to self-audit checklists from The McCalmon Group).

2021] EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE

973

ante moral hazard and ex post moral hazard. Ex ante moral
hazard involves the risk that, because of EPLI coverage, businesses will invest fewer resources into strategies that would
reduce the likelihood of wrongful employment acts occurring.
Ex post moral hazard is the risk that EPLI coverage will cause
businesses to take less care in reacting to wrongful employment acts.
We ultimately conclude that nothing exceptional stands
out in the EPLI market as far as ex ante moral hazard goes.
The incentives and actions of insurers on this issue appear to
match reasonably with society's wellbeing, or at least no less
than in other insurance markets. However, we argue that EPLI
creates a unique and acute problem of ex post moral hazard by
providing full coverage for employer-facilitated wrongs.
A.

Ex Ante Moral Hazard

The existence of EPLI does not appear to introduce ex ante
moral hazard to any greater extent than other forms of commercial liability insurance. First, insurers appear to be monitoring and reducing the likelihood of wrongful employment
acts. In the market for EPLI insurance, insurers use a variety
of strategies that reduce the amount of moral hazard from their
insureds, including deductibles, limits, and charging premiums based on a business's individual risk level.1 1 2 Indeed,
insurers themselves have private incentives to reduce moral
hazard,1 13 so their use of these strategies is unsurprising.
When insurers seek to reduce moral hazard for purposes of
their bottom line, society benefits as well. Loss prevention programs offered by many insurers are designed to combat ex ante
moral hazard and can help disseminate industry best practices
to businesses purchasing insurance.
While previous EPLI commentators have argued that the
risk-based approach to implementing loss control cuts against
the moral notions of employment law,11 4 we counter that any
shift away from moral notions is appropriate when there is a
112
See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein & Menahem E. Yaari, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, 30 J. ECON. THEORY 74, 74 (1983) (suggesting that the

practice of setting premium rates based on claims history, which is evidence of an
insured's risk level, reduces moral hazard); Ralph A. winter, Optimal Insurance
Under Moral Hazard, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 205, 207 (Georges Dionne ed., 2d
ed. 2013) (discussing deductibles and limits as potential tools for reducing moral
hazard).

13

See, e.g., winter, supranote 112, at 205 (describing moral hazard as im-

posing an externality on the insurer).
114 See supraPart IV.
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disconnect between the perpetrator and the entity that is held
liable for the perpetrator's actions.
B.

Ex Post Moral Hazard

At first glance, it would seem that insurers should face the
same incentives with regard to reducing ex post moral hazard
as with ex ante moral hazard. After all, moral hazard overall is
generally bad from an insurer's profit-maximizing standpoint.
However, the structure of the EPLI market as it stands
seems to indicate that EPLI insurers have chosen to ignore ex
post moral hazard for the most part by purporting to insure
employer-facilitated wrongs and punitive damages. Given the
lack of case law surrounding insurability for employer-facilitated wrongs,11 5 it is hard to say whether a court would allow
an insurance policy to stand in such cases. It is possible that if
an insurer wanted to challenge insurability on a public policy
basis, it could succeed in court.
However, four pieces of evidence seem to point to the fact
that insurance is widely available to cover employer-facilitated
wrongs. First is the Weinstein settlement itself. If ever there
was both a basis for a public policy challenge and a financial
incentive for an insurer to dispute coverage, this would appear

to be

it.

1

16

Yet, insurers are attempting to foot the settlement

bill for Weinstein's serial harassment, even going as far as to
note in the (since rejected)1 7 settlement agreement that, absent a settlement, some of Weinstein's insurers would dispute
coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion.118
Second, policy language in available sample policies provides little to no basis for excluding coverage of punitive damages associated with employer-facilitated wrongs.11 9 Indeed,
the existence of wraparound policies and most favored venue
clauses indicate an intent to provide such coverage. Third,
115 But see Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 338, 342, 348
(D. Mass. 2010) (finding that coverage of sexual harassment committed by company's president was excluded under an especially expansive intentional acts
exclusion, which had no final adjudication requirement), affd, 700 F.3d 585 (1st
Cir. 2012).
116 Some insurers did attempt to dispute coverage at the outset of the case but
are ultimately listed on the settlement agreement.

117 Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, No.
4266925, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).

1:17-Cv-9554

(AKH), 2020 WL

118 See Settlement Agreement and Release, supranote 1, at 130 ("Accordingly,
in light of the charges against and conviction of Harvey Weinstein, absent a
settlement, the insurance companies would continue to contest coverage in separate insurance coverage litigation with the Defendants.").
119 See, e.g., supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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twenty-six of the thirty-two insurers surveyed by the Betterley
Report do not exclude intentional actions.12 0 The remaining
insurers only exclude businesses' intentional actions to the
extent that they are criminal or fraudulent and are proven to be
so in a final adjudicatory judgment.
Finally, many states interpret insurance policies under a
reasonable expectations doctrine.1 2 1 While the specifics of the
doctrine vary by state, it generally calls for the terms of insurance policies to be interpreted in accordance with the "objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
even though painstaking study of the policy
beneficiaries ...
provisions would have negated those expectations."1 2 2 This
doctrine would further provide a solid basis for an insured to
argue that its EPLI policy should be construed in favor of coverage, given the minimal intentional acts exclusions written into
many current EPLI policies.1 2 3
It makes sense that intentional actions are included under
EPLI policies for those cases in which an employee commits an
intentional wrongful employment action, such as sexual harassment or disparate treatment discrimination, and their employer is held vicariously liable. However, the apparent
coverage of employer-facilitated wrongs, via a lack of exclusions for intentional acts along with only minimal exclusions
for businesses' criminal or fraudulent actions, generates strong
ex post moral hazard concerns.
To the extent that insurers do write coverage for employerfacilitated wrongs and punitive damages, upper management's
incentives to act responsibly are at a minimum. As discussed
in subpart II.B., punitive damages are meant to incentivize
businesses to respond to instances of wrongful employment
acts by levying punitive damages in cases of bad faith. However, if an insurer does not hold a business any more or less
accountable based on upper management's actions, they will
be incentivized to cover up any misbehavior.
See BET=ERLEY, supra note 48, at 36-37.
121 See, e.g., Clark-Peterson Co. v. Indep. Ins. Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677
(Iowa 1992) (holding that a coverage exclusion can be overridden by the reasonable expectations doctrine when an "ordinary layperson would misunderstand [the
policy's] coverage, or ... circumstances attributable to the insurer would foster
coverage expectations").
122 Robert E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
120

83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
123 See, e.g., Davidson v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1991) ("Provisions in an insurance policy, which are unambiguous when
read within the policy as a whole, but in effect, provide only illusory coverage,
should be enforced to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.").
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Previous research on the market for Directors & Officers
(D&O) liability insurance can help explain this result. D&O
insurance tends to exclude criminal and fraudulent acts in the
same way that the stricter EPLI policies do (by final adjudication), providing an apt case study for comparison. Also, EPLI
policies are sometimes written as a part of a D&O policy, making them closely related.
As mentioned in Part III, EPLI insurers offer policies that
either contain no exclusion for intentional or fraudulent acts,
or contain a provision that excludes coverage only if criminal or
fraudulent acts are established by a final adjudication. The
exclusion of acts that are deemed to be criminal or fraudulent
by final adjudication tracks very closely with typical exclusions
used in D&O insurance.1 2 4 Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
have done extensive research on D&O insurance and moral
hazard. They suggest that the "final adjudication" language in
D&O policies means that in practice, insurers often provide
insurance for fraud and criminal activity.1 2 5
They suggest a few reasons for this. First, plaintiffs often
plead facts that maximize their access to insurance funds. 126
Thus, they will avoid pleading facts that indicate criminal activity or fraud - even if such facts exist - in order to maintain
access to insurance funds.1 2 7 Second, because most litigation
settles, a final adjudication on which to base the exclusion is
rarely reached. Lastly, Baker and Griffith state that D&O insurers "understand that, in the long run, their D&O insurance
market will dry up if they press too hard on the fraud
exclusion."'12
While it may appear likely that an insurer will cover intentional actions based on the lack of exclusion language in the
policy, plaintiffs may still worry (or be advised by their own
counsel) that a court could potentially invalidate the insurance
coverage and leave them without access to insurance money if
they plead that the upper management acted intentionally,
fraudulently, or criminally.
Insurers can capitalize on this uncertainty. Indeed, in the
Weinstein case, the insurers at issue were willing to offer an
$18.9 million settlement rather than risk a larger jury award
124

See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 187

(2010).
125
126

Id.
Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 188.
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and pay to dispute coverage responsibilities. 1 2 9 The combination of Weinstein's apparent bankruptcy and the insurers'
threat of disputing coverage reduces the value of the settlement
by taking away bargaining power from the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
understand that if insurers were to successfully challenge their
coverage responsibilities, there would be minimal funds available for damages.
If, instead, coverage for employer-facilitated wrongs had
been tested extensively and were upheld in court, plaintiffs
would not shy away from pleading facts of employer-facilitated
wrongs. To the extent that plaintiffs avoid pleading such facts
due to uncertainty, the potential for punitive damages and the
value of a settlement are reduced, and the insurer (and employer) benefit. In sum, it appears that-while legality has not
been tested in court-the insurance industry is operating for
the most part under the assumption that businesses' intentional, criminal, or fraudulent acts, along with punitive damages, are insurable in the EPLI context.
Tom Baker has argued that the moral-hazard concern surrounding coverage for punitive damages is potentially overblown specifically because most insurance policies contain
exclusions for intentional damages.1 3 0 The exclusions for intentional damages, he suggests, negate any perverse incentives
that come with insuring punitive damages. Baker's analysis
applies to most insurance contexts. However, given that EPLI
policies cover punitive damages and rarely preclude coverage
for intentional acts, the EPLI market is operating in a state of
largely unrestrained ex post moral hazard. 13 1
VI
PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EMPLOYER-FACILITATED
WRONGS

This Part suggests regulatory changes designed to hold
businesses accountable for employer-facilitated wrongs. These
changes would reduce ex post moral hazard while allowing the
benefits created by EPLI to continue.
129
130

See Settlement Agreement and Release, supra note 1, at 120.
See Baker, supra note 62, at 102-03. Baker notes D&O insurance as a

potential exception to this analysis and acknowledges that punitive damages
coverage in the D&O context may indeed be of concern. Id. at 120 n.66.
131 See, e.g., Employment Practices Liability Insurancefor Law Firms, CHUBB,
https: / /www.chubb. com/us-en/business-insurance/employment-practices-liabillty-insurance-for-law-firms.html [https://perma.cc/PRD2-2W7W]
Jan. 31, 2021) ("No 'intentional acts' exclusion ...
").

(last visited
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First, employment laws could place specific restrictions on
EPLI contracts relating to employer-facilitated wrongs. These
restrictions would ensure that businesses with EPLI coverage
would be responsible for a larger portion of damages in cases of
employer-facilitated wrongs. Additionally, legislatures could
grant the EEOC (and corresponding state and local agencies,
known as Fair Employment Practices Agencies) 13 2 -the ability
to pursue uninsurable regulatory fines against businesses that
enable discrimination.
Both proposed changes would increase the expected cost
associated with employer-facilitated wrongs and, in turn, incentivize businesses to implement reasonable reporting systems and take action when faced with a wrongful employment
act.
A.

Regulating Insurers

The first group of strategies to improve accountability involves regulating EPLI contracts. Our two proposed changesright to subrogation and mandatory coinsurance-would both
increase the amount a business would owe in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs. At the same time, these changes
would not upset the amount of victim compensation available.
While insurance is typically regulated at the state level, it is
occasionally regulated at the federal level. Indeed, ERISA-an
employment law that EPLI does not cover-has regulated in13 3
surance as it applies to covering violations of ERISA.
Because many employment suits are brought under federal law, such as Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, Congress
could feasibly amend these statutes to place restrictions on the
EPLI market. Notably, any state legislatures making similar
changes would need to explicitly disavow most favored venue
clauses to combat insurers' attempts to circumvent state regulation of punitive damages. Both Congress and any state legisSee How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
132
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination [https://perma.cc/EC42-J8PX] (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
133 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (2018) ("Except as provided in sections 1105(b)(1) and
1105(d) of this title, any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports
to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability . .. under this part shall be
void as against public policy."); 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE S. COMM ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC wELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 320-21 (Comm. Print 1974) ("The sub-

stitute also provides, however, that a plan may purchase insurance for itself and
for its fiduciaries to cover liability or loss resulting from their acts or omissions if
the insurance permits recourse by the insurer against the fiduciaries in case of a
breach of fiduciary responsibility.").
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latures would need to disavow the legality of wrap-around
policies to avoid coverage from off-shore policies.
1.

Mandatory Risk Sharing

As mentioned in subpart III.B, all insurers currently offer
EPLI policies that carry zero percent coinsurance. While insureds may purchase a policy with a nonzero coinsurance rate
in exchange for a lower premium, this is not required. We

suggest that one means for realigning businesses' incentives
with the goals of deterrence could be requiring a mandatory
minimum coinsurance rate in the case of employer-facilitated
wrongs. Under this proposal, all EPLI contracts would be required to contain a clause with a minimum coinsurance rate
that would kick in for cases of employer-facilitated wrongs.
Such a provision, as long as the minimum mandated coinsurance rate is set high enough, would create a needed incentive
for businesses to implement reasonable reporting systems and
address wrongful employment acts head-on as they are made
aware of them.
2.

Subrogation

Another potential solution may be to mandate that all EPLI
contracts contain a right to subrogation in cases of employerfacilitated wrongs. In general, subrogation allows an insurer to
pursue a lawsuit against the wrongdoer in place of the victim. 13 4 In the typical subrogation context, an insurer will pay
out a claim for losses to make the victim whole. The insurer
will then seek to recover the money paid in that claim from the
wrongdoer. Figure 1 illustrates the current structure of employment claims when EPLI is involved, while Figure 2 illustrates what the process would look like if subrogation existed
as we envision.

134
See Julia Kagan, Subrogation, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 19, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/s/subrogation.asp [https://perma.cc/WHV6-

94HX].
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Figure 1. Current System

* Files lawsuit against employer
* Standard for liability articulated in employment law

" Files claim with insurer
*Claim is covered if it falls within purview of
insurance contract

SPays or disputes claim (insurer can dispute or
threaten to dispute coverage of employerfacilitated wrongs)

Figure 2. Proposed System
Step 1:
" Files lawsuit against employer
SStandard for liability articulated in employment law

" Files claim with insurer

*Claim is covered if it falls within purview of
insurance contract

" Pays or disputes claim (no dispute based on
employer-facilitated wrongs)

j
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Step 2:
S Files lawsuit against employer
c Standard for liability is failure to set up a reasonable
reporting system or involvement/awareness of
upper management

" Can settle
" If court determines the standard for employerfacilitated wrong is met, the employer owes the
insurer any money paid to the victim in settlement
or damages

Subrogation is traditionally only brought by an insurance
company against a third party. In fact, in most instances it is
impossible or illegal for an insurance company to bring a
subrogation action against its own insured. 135 We argue that
in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs - which are already
incredibly unique to the extent they are insurable-such
subrogation is a desirable possibility. 136
3.

Promoting Victim Compensation

One might wonder why -- if the moral hazard issue is so
concerning - it isn't desirable to just place an outright ban on
insurance coverage for employer-facilitated wrongs. The short
answer is that ideally, victims of employer-facilitated wrongs
should not bear the burden of insufficient funds to pay damages. Rather, we argue, this burden should be on insurance
companies.
Another line of insurance - commercial crime insurance
- provides a useful framework for explaining this point. Commercial crime insurance provides employee theft coverage,
which insures against any employee's theft of a business's
135
Craig F. Stanovich, Subrogation and the CGL Policy, IRMI (Dec. 2013),
https: / /www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/subrogation-and-the-cglpolicy [https://perma.cc/4DPX-QT5L]; see Antisubrogation Rule, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
136 Rick Swedloff argues that if insurers were to offer coverage for intentional
torts, subrogation against an insured would be appropriate. See Rick Swedloff,

Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 759 (2012).
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money or property.1 3 7 Commercial crime insurance resembles
EPLI coverage in that it covers bad acts by employees.
Unlike EPLI, the commercial crime insurance market has
come to exclude coverage for any crimes that are committed
directly by company owners or partners. 13 8 Commercial crime
insurance further excludes coverage for any crime committed
by an employee if the owner was aware of a prior theft by that
same employee.1 3 9 In other words, commercial crime insurance creates incentives for owners, partners, and other company decision makers to avoid participating in employee theft
and to take an active role in combatting employee theft. Both of
these exclusions mirror our concerns of employer-facilitated

wrongs.
When upper management fails to address an existing employment wrong of which it is aware, it can still benefit from
EPLI coverage. In contrast, if a business owner fails to address
even a risk of employee theft - as evidenced by that individual
employee's prior theft record - the business cannot benefit
from its commercial crime insurance policy. Thus, in the ways
that EPLI fails at reducing ex post moral hazard, commercial
crime insurance succeeds. Commercial crime insurance has
essentially eliminated coverage for its equivalent of employerfacilitated wrongs.
The difference between commercial crime insurance and
EPLI is that no third party is harmed in cases of employee theft.
Commercial crime insurance covers theft of the insured business's own property. EPLI, in contrast, involves harm to a third
party - the wronged employee. Thus, EPLI presents the additional consideration of the availability of damages to properly
compensate the injured employee.
In both of our suggestions to regulate insurance contracts,
the victim of an employment wrong would not lose out on insurance funds because of upper management's fault. In these
situations, any insurance funds would be available to victims
in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs, and it would be between the insurer and the insured business to determine the
split of liability between them. By making it clear that upper
management's fault does not drive the existence of insurance
137 See The Basics of Commercial Crime Insurance, MARSH, https://
www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/basics-of-commercial-crime-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/VM3L-4532] (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
138 See Adrian Mak, Commercial Crime Insurance, ADVISORSMrrH (Dec. 18,
2020), https://advisorsmith.com/commercial-crime-insurance/
[https://
perma.cc/E28R-F6GK].
139
Id.
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coverage - and rather is only relevant as to what the business
owes the insurer - society would be able to avoid situations
like that of Weinstein, where insurers are seemingly using the
threat of a coverage dispute to lower the settlement's value.
Additionally, entirely banning insurance for employer-facilitated wrongs would create an even stronger incentive for
plaintiffs to strategically plead facts that avoid the issue of
upper-management involvement. As mentioned above, plaintiffs often prioritize access to insurance money and seek to
craft complaints such that insurance coverage is available.
Thus, even in cases where upper management acted intentionally, the wronged employee would have an incentive to
avoid bringing that fact to light. This would lead to the same
outcome as the current system, in that businesses would likely
not be held any more accountable for employer-facilitated
wrongs than other wrongful employment acts in which upper
management responds appropriately.
4.

PotentialDownsides to InsuranceRegulation

The greatest criticism of combating ex post moral hazard
through insurance regulation is that insurance companies may
refuse to spend the money to investigate whether a claim is the
result of an employer-facilitated wrong. Indeed, this is an issue
in both insurance-based solutions we offer. As was the case in
the proposed Weinstein settlement, insurers made the conscious choice to offer a settlement worth $18.9 million rather
than risk greater damages at trial and pay to dispute their
coverage responsibilities.
However, the current EPLI market is a result of competition
that has created a pressure to provide coverage for punitive
damages and employer-facilitated wrongs. Further, the uncertainty surrounding insurability in cases of employer-facilitated
wrongs means that insurers can use the threat of coverage
disputes to pressure plaintiffs into lower settlements. By requiring contractual provisions that would both clarify coverage
in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs and place the burden of
insured businesses' bankruptcy on the insurer - rather than
the victim - the status quo would change and likely leave
insurers with a more stable ground and better incentives to
challenge their share of liability. Regardless, the next subpart
discusses a supplemental solution that could help alleviate this
concern.

984
B.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:947

Creating Uninsurable EEOC Fines

Although not its primary role, the EEOC has the authority
to litigate on behalf of injured employees. From a deterrence
standpoint, the main problem with the current setup is that
any damages resulting from these suits are insurable, just as
those brought by private parties. Regulatory fines, in contrast,
are generally excluded from insurance contracts except in the
data privacy context.1 4 0
With regard to public enforcement, the simplest policy solution is to have any damages awarded from EEOC litigation
subject to the same standards we propose for suits brought by
employees; that is, require proportional risk sharing and allow
subrogation against businesses sued by the EEOC for cases of
employer-facilitated wrongs. This option would then parallel
the insurance regulation structure we propose for businesses
sued by employees instead of by an agency.
To combat the concerns described above about insurer enforcement, we additionally suggest that legislatures grant the
EEOC and state agencies the power to pursue uninsurable
regulatory fines in cases of employer-facilitated wrongs, above
and beyond damages for individual victims. The idea of uninsurable regulatory fines would parallel fines in many other regulatory structures. It is unique that the risk associated with
the EEOC's sole enforcement mechanism can be transferred
entirely to an insurance company. Currently, a company that
purchases an EPLI policy is completely shielded from any action the EEOC wishes to bring, as long as it is willing to pay the
right price for its premiums.
This change would leave in place the EEOC's traditional
mission while promoting deterrence and reducing ex post
moral hazard, without reducing the amount of money available
to victims for compensation. Further, the addition of uninsurable regulatory fines would allow the EEOC to supplement insurers' responsibility in holding businesses responsible for
employer-facilitated wrongs.
CONCLUSION

The creation and expansion of the EPLI market have reduced loss uncertainty for businesses wishing to transfer risk
of employment liability. Moreover, EPLI insurers couple exten140 Regulatory Defense and PenaltiesCoverage, IRMI, https://www.irmi.com/
term/insurance-definitions/regulatory-defense-and-penalties-coverage [https://
perma.cc/LMN9-LMD4] (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
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sive risk management programs with their coverage offerings,
designed to help businesses comply with employment law.
Coverage also generally expands the funds available to victims
of wrongful employment acts.
Along with these benefits, however, comes one considerable cost. The current structure of the EPLI market seems to
generate strong ex post moral hazard. By providing full insurance for actions that are either facilitated or covered up by
high-level employees, EPLI removes incentives to address
wrongful employment acts at the company level.
Legislators could address this by regulating EPLI contracts
and granting the EEOC the power to issue uninsurable fines.
Both options would incentivize businesses to take appropriate
actions in the face of wrongful employment acts without disturbing the benefits created by EPLI.
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